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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-4856
                    
HENKEL CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO HENKEL LOCTITE
CORPORATION formerly known as LOCTITE CORPORATION,
                                      Appellant
v.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY;
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-01266)
District Judge:  The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 3, 2008
                    
Before: BARRY, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 27, 2008)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant, Henkel Corporation (“Henkel”), sought monetary damages and
      The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 1
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2
declaratory relief against Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (“Hartford”) as a
result of Hartford’s refusal to provide defense and indemnity coverage pursuant to
insurance policies issued to Henkel’s predecessor-in-interest, Loctite Corporation
(“Loctite”).  The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We will affirm.1
I.
Henkel’s complaint sets forth the following facts.  Loctite acquired Permatex
Company, Inc. (“Permatex Company”) in 1972.  Initially, Permatex Company was a
subsidiary of Loctite, but in 1978 it merged into Loctite.  Between 1976 and 1985,
Hartford issued to Loctite policies of comprehensive general liability insurance and
policies of completed operations and products liability insurance (the “Hartford
Policies”).  Henkel purchased Loctite in 1997 and the companies merged in 2004, with
Henkel being the surviving corporation.  Henkel is Loctite’s successor-in-interest to the
Hartford Policies.
Pursuant to the Hartford Policies, Hartford agreed to provide defense and
indemnity coverage for Loctite as follows:
The company [Hartford] will pay on behalf of the insured [Loctite] all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of
3Coverage A – bodily injury or
Coverage B – property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any
of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient . . . .
(Complaint ¶ 25, App. at 21a).  Bodily injuries caused by hazardous products sold,
manufactured, or distributed by Loctite are within the scope of the policies.
Lawsuits have been filed in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania state courts
alleging that the plaintiffs have suffered injuries as a result of exposure to products
containing asbestos, including Permatex-brand products (the “Underlying Suits”).  None
of the Underlying Suits named Henkel, Loctite, or Permatex Company as a defendant. 
The New Jersey suits mistakenly named Permatex Industrial Corporation (“Permatex
Industrial”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Henkel, as a defendant.  The New York and
Pennsylvania suits erroneously named Permatex, Inc., an entity completely unrelated to
Henkel, as a defendant.  Neither Permatex Industrial nor Permatex, Inc. have ever sold,
manufactured, distributed, or otherwise assumed liability for any Permatex-brand
products containing asbestos.  Henkel alleges that it is the only party potentially liable for
injuries caused by Permatex-brand asbestos-containing products.
For reasons not discussed in the complaint, Henkel, and Loctite previously, have
incurred costs defending, and settling some of, the Underlying Suits even though it is not
      Included within the appendix is a three-page brief in support of a motion to dismiss2
filed by Permatex Industrial in one of the Underlying Suits.  The brief simply states:
“Plaintiff has apparently confused Permatex Industrial Corporation with another
Permatex entity.  Accordingly, Permatex Industrial Corporation should be dropped as a
defendant in this suit as an improperly named party.  N.J. Rule Civ. P. 4:30.”  (App. at
232a.)  It is unclear why Henkel did not direct its subsidiary, Permatex Industrial, to take
this seemingly simple step in all of the cases and wait to be substituted as a defendant
before beginning to defend and/or settle these actions in its own name.
4
named as a defendant.   It provided proper and timely notice of the Underlying Suits to2
Hartford but Hartford refused to provide defense and indemnity coverage under the
Hartford Policies.  The complaint seeks damages from Hartford for breach of contract and
bad faith refusal to honor its defense and indemnity obligations under the Hartford
Policies, and also requests a declaration that Hartford is obligated to defend and
indemnify Henkel in all pending and future cases alleging injury as a result of exposure to
Permatex-brand asbestos-containing products.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, holding that Hartford has no duty to defend Henkel in the
Underlying Suits because it had only agreed to defend and indemnify Loctite in cases
where Loctite (or a predecessor or successor-in-interest) is named as a defendant in the
underlying action.  The District Court expressly declined to decide whether Pennsylvania
or Connecticut law controlled, reasoning that the result would be the same under either
state’s laws.
5II.
We exercise plenary review of a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006).  “When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we are required to accept as true all of the allegations
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132
F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
III.
Henkel argues that the District Court erred in dismissing its complaint by: (1)
concluding that the case did not present an actual conflict between Pennsylvania and
Connecticut law; (2) failing to treat Henkel’s factual allegations as true and not
construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Henkel; (3) concluding that there
was no possibility that Hartford owed a duty to defend and indemnify Henkel; (4) failing
to consider extrinsic evidence suggesting that Hartford had actual knowledge of its duty
to defend and indemnify Henkel; and (5) finding no ambiguity in the text of the section of
the Hartford Policies defining the scope of Hartford’s duty to defend and indemnify
Henkel.  These arguments are wholly unavailing.
We agree with the District Court that this case does not present an actual conflict
between Pennsylvania and Connecticut law.  Both jurisdictions give effect to clear and
unambiguous language in an insurance contract unless doing so would be contrary to
      Henkel’s argument that this construction of the policy would “effectively eviscerate3
coverage for all manufacturers with branded products” is without merit.  (Reply Br. at 1.) 
Sophisticated businesses are free to acquire the insurance they deem appropriate, and,
having done so, they are bound to deal with the consequences of those decisions.  
      In its reply brief, Henkel argues for the first time that, in the alternative, it should be4
granted leave to amend its complaint.  That argument, too, is unavailing.  See, e.g.,
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (“We
generally refuse to consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”); United
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s
failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on
appeal.”).
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public policy, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ace Am. Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d
224, 231 (Conn. 2007); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 938 A.2d 888, 907 (Pa. 2006).  The contractual provision at issue in this
case could not be more clear.  Indeed, the only reasonable construction of the phrase
“[Hartford] shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured,” is that an
insured entity (Permatex Company, Loctite, or Henkel) must be named as a defendant in a
suit before Hartford’s duty to defend and indemnify is triggered.   Even viewing all of the3
factual allegations in the light most favorable to Henkel, we are left with the inescapable
conclusion that Hartford has no duty to defend because an insured entity has not been
named as a defendant in any of the Underlying Suits.  No amount of extrinsic evidence
will change this.  We will, therefore, affirm the judgment of the District Court.   4
